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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VENUS ANN SHERARD,
Petitioner,
v*
Case No. 890383-CA
Priority No. 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent•

INTRODUCTION
Ms. Sherard requests rehearing of this case.

See Brown v.

Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing
rehearing); Cummincrs v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same).
A copy of this Court's opinion is in Appendix 1.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD MODIFY
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE ANALYSIS
BY APPLYING THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW.
This Court's analysis of whether Ms. Sherard was entitled
to a lesser included offense instruction is consistent with Utah
law, with the exception of the standard of review applied.
Following the State's argument on page 2 of Respondent's brief, this
Court found that the lesser included offense instruction issue was
to be reviewed for correctness.

Sherard at 8, citing Carpet Barn v.

Department of Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert, denied
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)(citing Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133

(Utah 1989)).
The Carpet Barn and Ramon cases relied on by this Court
involve jury instructions in civil cases.
Lesser included offense instructions in criminal cases are
different from jury instructions in civil cases, because the lesser
included offense instructions are essential to the criminal
defendants' constitutional rights to due process, to be tried by a
jury, and to the full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.

E.g. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986);

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156-157 (Utah 1983); State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988).
Because the lesser included offense instructions are
essential to these constitutional rights, a very high standard of
review applies.

This Court must view all of the evidence and

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
defendant.

E.g. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986);

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 533 (Utah 1983); State v. Oldrovd, 685
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984).
As the State conceded in its brief, the transcript of the
police interview between Ms. Sherard and Officer Mendez supports the
lesser included offense instruction in this case.

See Respondents

brief at 31-33, included in Appendix 2 to this petition.

While

other evidence presented in this case may appear to contradict the
police interview, id., conflicting evidence requires the jury's
assessment of credibility and resolution through lesser included
offense instructions.

E.g. State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555
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-

(Utah 1984); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983); State v.
Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986).
This Court should rewrite the portion of the Sherard
opinion indicating that the standard of appellate review is for
correctness, and clarify that this Court will review lesser included
offense instruction issues by viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant, and by leaving the credibility of
conflicting evidence to the jury.
In the event that this Court agrees that the trial court
violated Ms. Sherard's right to a lesser included offense
instruction, this Court should then resolve whether the trial
court's error was prejudicial.1

The question from the jurors

concerning how to distinguish between second degree homicide and
manslaughter, and the trial court's inadequate response to that
question, preclude a finding of harmless error in this case.

See

Ms. Sherard's reply brief at 16-18.

1. The Sherard opinion discusses the concept of harmless
error in another case but appears to conclude that there was no
error, rather than harmless error, in this case. The opinion states:
Lastly, in Standiford. the Utah Supreme
Court, on similar facts, held that "since the
jury convicted of second degree murder despite
the fact that an instruction was given on the
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure
to give a negligent homicide instruction was, at
very best, harmless error.11 Standiford. 769 P.2d
at 267. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court did not err in refusing to instruct the
jury on negligent homicide.
Id. at 10.
- 3
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II.
THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY CRIMINAL STANDARDS
IN COMPLETELY ASSESSING THE PRESERVATION OF
THE VOIR DIRE ISSUE CONCERNING
RUBY KELLY'S FAMILY MEMBERS.
This Court disposed of the issue concerning the trial
court's failure to voir dire the prospective jurors about their
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members with the conclusion that
defense counsel failed to preserve the issue.

Sherard at 6.

This Court has yet to address whether the trial court
should have asked the jurors concerning their contact with Ruby
Kelly's family members, regardless of defense counsel's pursuit of
the questions.

The questions concerning Ruby Kelly's family members

are based on statutory grounds for for-cause challenges.

The trial

court should have investigated this concern as part of a minimally
sufficient voir dire in this court-conducted voir dire state.

See

State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 442-448 (Utah App.)(discussing trial
court's duty to insure criminal defendants' right to an impartial
jury), cert, denied (Utah Sept. 18, 1991); Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 18 (discussing jury selection and bases for for-cause
challenges).

The trial courts' responsibility in criminal

voir dires is discussed more fully at page 23 of Ms. Sherard's
opening brief and at pages 2 through 7 of Ms. Sherard's reply brief.
This Court has yet to address the plain error question.
The trial court was aware of the history of threats from Ruby
Kelly's family members and was approached by one of the prospective
jurors, who indicated that his contact with Ruby Kelly's family
members precluded his service as a juror in this case.

- 4
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In these

circumstances, regardless of counsel's pursuit of the questions, and
regardless of whether the trial courts have a duty to investigate
the statutory grounds for for-cause challenges in every case, the
trial court should have asked the potential jurors concerning their
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members.

The plain error argument

is discussed further at pages 20 through 23 of Ms. Sherard's opening
brief and is also supported by pages 6 through 8 of the reply brief.
This Court's conclusion that defense counsel failed to
preserve the issue concerning Ruby Kelly's family members is based
on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20,2 and on a civil case, Doe v.
Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App.), cert, granted 789 P.2d 33
(Utah Nov. 29, 1989).

2.

Sherard at 6.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 states:

Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court
are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party
state his objections to the actions of the court
and the reasons therefor. If a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the
absence of an objection shall not thereafter
prejudice him.
(Emphasis added).
This Rule of Criminal Procedure does not require criminal
defense attorneys to object to omissions of the trial courts, such
as the failure to ask necessary voir dire questions. The parallel
Rule of Civil Procedure 46 requires civil attorneys to bear the
burden of objecting to omissions of the trial courts. The civil
rule states:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of
the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that
a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court
the action which he desires the court to take or
his objection to the action of the court and his
(continued)
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-

As explained at pages 17 through 19 of Ms. Sherard's
opening brief, voir dire in criminal cases is essential to the
constitutional rights to a fair trial provided by article I sections
7, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the fifth and sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution.3

As explained at

pages 2 through 4 of Ms. Sherard's reply brief, the constitutional
rights at stake have been recognized in Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 18, which places the burden for adequate voir dire on the
trial courts in criminal cases.
Previous Utah criminal cases discussing the preservation of
issues concerning the adequacy of voir dire have been decided under
Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-12(d).

Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure 12(d) is identical to that statute and provides:
Failure of the defendant to timely raise
defenses or objections or to make requests which
must be made prior to trial or at the time set by
the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but
the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
Comparison of the facts of this case with the Utah criminal
cases decided under the language of this rule demonstrates that the

(footnote 2 continued)
grounds therefor; and, if a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the
time it is made, the absence of an objection does
not thereafter prejudice him.
(Emphasis added)•
3. See e.g. State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802-803 (Utah
1990)(appellate courts are obliged to address the merits of
constitutional issues if raised for first time in appellate court,
if liberty interest is at stake).
- 6

issue concerning the trial court's failure to inquire about juror
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members is preserved for this
Court's review.
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), the defendant
tried to impeach the verdict with juror affidavits reflecting
discussions during deliberations about juror bias against accused
child abusers.

Id. at 83. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial

court's refusal to accept the juror affidavits, and indicated that
defense counsel waived the issue concerning juror bias during
voir dire of the jurors.

The court stated:

During voir dire, the jurors were not asked about
experiences they may have had with child abuse or
about biases they might have against one accused
of harming a child. This is true despite the
fact that DeMille's counsel was given an
opportunity to question the jurors, an
opportunity he declined. . . . We therefore hold
that DeMille's failure to voir dire the jurors on
this quite forseeable issue or object to the
trial court's failure to cover the issue
constitutes a waiver and bars inquiry into the
bias question.
Id. at 83.
In State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130 (Utah 1983)(per curiam),
the appellants' brief indicates that voir dire questions were
requested "in camera."

Miller appellants' brief at 3.

The State's

brief in Miller indicates that "[t]here is no evidence in the record
(a) that appellants' counsel requested that such questions be
incorporated into voir dire or (b) that appellants' counsel objected
to voir dire at any time prior to the presentation of evidence."
Miller Respondent's Brief at 8.

The Utah Supreme Court concluded
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that the issue concerning the adequacy of the voir dire was waived,
stating, "Counsel neither objected, reminded the judge of the
oversight, made a new request, nor asked permission personally to
voir dire the jury under U.C.A., 1953, §77-35-18(b)."

Id. at 131.

In this case, defense counsel submitted a motion for
counsel-conducted voir dire, which was denied without prejudice.
When defense counsel tried to participate in the voir dire, the
trial court ordered counsel to address the voir dire question to the
court (T. 53). Defense counsel submitted written proposed voir dire
questions and written amended proposed voir dire questions, both of
which specifically addressed juror acquaintance and/or contact with
Ruby Kelly#s family members.

Defense counsel requested questions at

an unrecorded bench conference, reserved objections to all questions
omitted by the trial court and requested by counsel, and explicitly
attempted to mention each question omitted by the trial court.
Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 15-17.
Under the preservation standards of criminal law, the issue
concerning the inadequacy of the voir dire on juror contact with
Ruby Kelly's family members is preserved.

III.
THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT
TWO FACTUAL ASSERTIONS IN SHERARD
WHICH CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE.
Ascertaining the actual facts of this case is extremely
difficult because of the numerous inconsistent accounts provided by
the witnesses.

Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 3.
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However, to the best knowledge of counsel, there is no
record support for this Court's factual statements which follow:
When Sherard reached the front yard of
Salazar's house, she met one of her friends whose
face was bloody. The friend said that Kelly had
hit her. In response, Sherard said that she
wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight
broke out between the two women.
Sherard at 2.
The State's assimilation of the evidence indicates that
prior to Ms. Sherard's first fight with Ruby Kelly, Ms. Sherard had
a fist fight with another young woman, either in the living room or
outside the house.

Respondent's brief at 8.

Ms. Sherard's assimilation of the evidence indicates that
prior to Ms. Sherard's first fight with Ruby Kelly, Ms. Sherard was
jumped by two young women in the living room and then fought a young
woman outside.

Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 5-13.

In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
indicated that several witnesses testified that Ms. Sherard
approached the second fight with Ruby Kelly:
As to the third element, although Sherard
testified that she acted in self-defense, several
witnesses testified that Sherard returned to
Kelly, and without justification, resumed the
fight.
Sherard at 5.
Of the six witnesses who were asked about how the second
fight between Ms. Sherard and Ruby Kelly began, only one indicated
that Ms. Sherard ran toward the second fight (T. 321). Two
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witnesses indicated that Ruby Kelly ran toward Ms. Sherard for the
second fight (T. 249; 299). One witness indicated that Ruby Kelly
and one other person ran to fight Ms. Sherard for the second fight
(T. 463, 492). One witness indicated that Ruby Kelly and the crowd
ran to the second fight with Ms. Sherard (T. 195-196).

One witness

indicated that the second fight started after unidentified people
ran toward Ms. Sherard (T. 525).

CONCLUSION
Ms. Sherard requests rehearing of this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £6tL

j^

^0-C

day of September, 1991.

cdQX

JOAN C. WATT

Attorney for Petitioner

v

lABETH H6LBROQK
ELIZA1
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATION
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, do hereby certify the following:
(1) I am the attorney for Petitioner in this case;
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.

t

1:
EV-:ZABETtf holLBROOk

n

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this SOtL

day of

September, 1991.

ELI2iAbETtt H6LBRQ«

DELIVERED by

this

of September, 1991.

- 11 -

day

APPENDIX 1
Sherard Opinion

EPW1991

/&&«<a^—

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
T.Noooan
Cteric of the Court
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OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890383-CA

Venus Ann Sherard,
F I L E D
(September 10, 1991)

Defendant and Appellant,

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, and Elizabeth
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
RUSSON,. Judge:
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction of criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We affirm.
FACTS
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah App.
1991).
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 7, 1987, Sherard,
with friends, went to a party at Vikki Salazar's home. The
party had started around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived, about
thirty to forty people were present, most of whom were drinking.
A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby Kelly, the
victim in this case, arrived at the party with two friends,

Kristi Bray and Tanya Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but
did know Benns, who was a member of a rival gang. Benns began
jarguing with Sherard and others, and in response, Salazar
asked Keily and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's
protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead.
When Sherard reached the front yard of Salazar's house,
she met one of her friends whose face was bloody. The friend
said that Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said that
she wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight broke out
between the two women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard walked away, Benns
taunted her to continue the fight. According to one witness,
Eloy Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard asked him for
a knife, which he gave her. Additionally, at least two
witnesses heard someone shout that Sherard had a knife; another
testified that he actually saw the knife in Sherard's hand.
Sherard testified that Esquibel put "something- into her hand,
which she did not look at, but believed was a knife.
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed, moving into the
street. According to several witnesses, Sherard delivered
several uppercuts to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness
to the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with
the knife in her hand. Todd Kingston, another witness to the
fight, testified that after the fight he took a knife from
Sherard and threw it away; several other witnesses saw him do
so. Additionally, Tommy Quintana, a friend of Sherard,
testified that Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly.
Kelly died from nine stab wounds.
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of
murder in the second degree. Sherard appeals that conviction,
raising the following four points: (1) Was there sufficient
evidence presented at trial to sustain her conviction for
murder in the second degree? (2) Did the trial court abuse its
discretion in limiting the voir dire- of the prospective
jurors? (3) Did the trial court properly deny her request for
a jury instruction on negligent homicide? (4) Did the trial
court commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury
on self-defense and mutual combat?
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Sherard argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the second

degree.
On appeal, we review the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict. State v, Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989)
(citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we substitute our own
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the
jury. State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); fi££
also State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1988). On
appeal, we will reverse only if the evidence "is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt- that the defendant
committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v.
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted);
£££ alSQ Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State Vt JQB9S# 793 P.2d 902,
903-04 (Utah App. 1990).
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another panel of
this court clarified our marshaling requirement and applied it
to criminal jury trials. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39
(Utah App. 1990). Moore held that in order for an appellant's
sufficiency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the merits,
the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
jury's verdict and demonstrate that, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict below.
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled the
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor shown that, in
spite of this evidence, the verdict below is unsupportable.
Appellant's brief contains no references whatsoever to the
evidence presented at trial. In an apparent effort to respond
to the marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply brief
contains a matrix that lists various witnesses and their
testimony.on:.a number of issues. However-*;;.upoa examination,
this matrix amounts to no more than an outline of transcript
citations. The reply brief contains no indication as to what
evidence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence opposes
it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the chart. Nor does
the reply brief contain any argument as to why the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case. In
other words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record for
us to review for sufficiency.
However, since Moore, by its own terms, is meant to apply
only prospectively, JL£. at 739, and since this appeal was filed
prior to the court's decision in Mcoxa, we review Sherard's
sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits.

The jury was instructed on second degree murder as follows:
Before you can convict the defendant,
Venus Ann Sherard, of the crime of Criminal
Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree, as
charged in the Information on file in this
case, you must find from all of the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of
the following elements of that offense.
1. That on or about the 7th day of
March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard,
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and
2. That said defendant then and
there did so: (a) intentionally or
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another, she
committed an act clearly dangerous to human
life; or (c) knowingly acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, she engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk [of]
death to another;
3. That said defendant caused the
death in an unlawful manner and without
justification,.
If you are convinced of the truth of
each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty of the
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
Second Degree as charged in the Information.
If, on the other hand, you find that
the State has failed to prove any of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you
must find the defendant not guilty.
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is sufficiently
conclusive to support the said verdict. As to the first
element, all witnesses' accounts of the fight support the
conclusion that Sherard caused the death of Kelly. As to the
second element, Sherard's own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave
her something -heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like
metal or something," which she believed was a knife, and that
she punched Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the
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very least, a depraved indifference to human life. This
conclusion is further supported by the testimony of numerous
witnesses who recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy
Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him for a knife before
resuming the fight, and various witnesses' accounts of the
second fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that he
actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a knife in her hand.
As to the third element, although Sherard testified that she
acted in self-defense, several witnesses testified that Sherard
returned to Kelly and, without justification, resumed the
fight. Given the amount of evidence which supports the State's
case, we cannot say that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that Sherard was guilty of second degree
murder, and therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict.
II.

VOIR DIRE

Sherard next claims that the trial court erred in limiting
the voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, she
objects to the extent of the trial court's inquiry as to:
(1) the relationship or contact between prospective jurors and
Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliations, (3) experience
with and attitude toward alcohol, (4) experience with and
attitude toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity.
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a challenge for
cause and to assist counsel in the intelligent use of
peremptory challenges. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah
App.), ££££. Granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State v.
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839/ 844 (Utah 1983) and Hornsbv v.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah

*Aprp.)/•££!£. deniedflttbnam. ffornsbyv,' LPS Church/- 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire is within the discretion
of the.trial judge, as long ascounsel is given adequate
information with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id.
Moreover, "whether the judge has abused that discretion is
determined, not by considering isolated questions, but
•considering the totality of the questioning.•- Id. at 457-58
(quotingfil-atev. Bishoo, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)).
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning the
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby
Kelly's family, was not properly preserved for appeal. When
asked to pass the jury for cause, defense counsel objected to

the omission of several requested areas of- inquiry# including
the other matters raised on appeal herein. However, defense
counsel did not object to the lack of inquiry into the
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby
Kelly's family. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 provides
that counsel -state his objections to the actions of the court
and the reasons therefor.- See also Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d at
458. Since defense counsel failed to do so as to this issue,
it was not properly preserved for appeal.
Sherard1s second claim of inadequate voir dire, group
affiliations of the prospective jurors, also fails. The two
requested questions in this area that were not asked by the
trial court were:
Do you belong to any clubs or
organizations? Which ones?
What kinds of hobbies and leisure time
activities do you enjoy?
On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of inquiry would have
revealed whether potential jurors could relate to the lifestyle
of gang members or find such lifestyle opprobrious. However,
she fails to support this blanket claim with any argument or
analysis as to how either of the requested questions is
probative of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle of
gang members. Moreover, this was never given as a reason for
requesting these questions below. Since the trial courts have
been instructed not to allow "inordinately extensive or
unfocused questioning," id. at 457, we find no abuse of
discretion on behalf of the trial court in refusing to ask
these questions either.
On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked the
potential jurors:
There may be evidence during the course
of this case that there were alcoholic
beverages being consumed by the
defendant, the victim and maybe others in
their surroundings. Do any of you
believe that it is simply morally wrong
to consume alcoholic beverages in all
cases and under all circumstances, if so,
would you raise your hand?

There were no affirmative responses to this question. Sherard
claims that this question, was insufficient because it failed to
address potential jurors* attitudes toward and experiences with
alcohol. As to the former, we are of the opinion that this is
precisely the sort of question which is designed to elicit
potential jurors* attitudes toward alcohol. As to the latter,
it is the trial court's duty to -protect juror privacy." State
v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is
the trial court's duty to forbid defense counsel to "conduct an
inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences of a
venireman." Id. On the facts of this case, it was sufficient
for the trial court to inquire on the attitudes of the
potential jurors as to alcohol, without specifically inquiring
as to their experiences with it. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion on this matter.
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadequacy of
investigation into the potential jurors' experiences with and
attitudes toward violence. With respect to this issue, the
trial court asked four questions: "[H]ave any of you been
involved in a fist fight before?"; "Have any of you been in a
fist fight or in a fight where weapons have been used?";
"[Have] any of you [] been witnesses to a serious injury as a
result of a fight involving weapons . . . ?"; and "Do any of
you believe that there is no circumstance or that it is morally
wrong to be in a fight at all situations . . . ?" Taken as a
whole, these questions were designed to and did elicit
responses on the prospective jurors' experiences with and
attitudes toward violence. Thus, the trial court's refusal to
inquire further was not an abuse of discretion.
The final issue with regard to voir dire is Sherard's
claim that the jurors were not adequately questioned as to
their exposure to publicity. The judge conducted the following
inquiry:
Have any of you heard anything about this
case, if so, would you raise your hand?
You can say yes or no to the question.
Have you heard about this case?

All right. Would your familiarity with
the reporting cause you any reason to

believe you could not be fair and
impartial in this case?

If you read something in the newspaper
would you be caused to believe that this
would be true simply because it's in the
newspaper?

If you heard testimony here in conflict
with that which you read in the newspaper
would you be willing to follow that which
you believed from the courtroom that you
heard in testimony rather than that which
you read in the newspaper?
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial publicity concerns
the court's failure to ask about specific magazines which the
jurors read or to which they subscribed. However, defense
counsel presented no argument to connect specific magazines
with pre-trial publicity below, nor does counsel present such
argument here. It is abundantly clear that the questions
asked, in fact, revealed more about jurors' familiarity with
pre-trial publicity than a vague question about specific
magazines subscribed to and read could possibly have elicited.
Therefore, again we find no abuse of discretion.
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to limit voir
dire did not prevent detection of bias, nor did it limit
defense counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory
challenges. Accordinglyt we find no abuse of discretion in the
limitation of voir dire by the trial court in this case.
III.

NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

Sherard next asserts that the trial court erred in failing
to give her requested jury instruction on negligent homicide.
We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested
instruction under a correction of error standard, granting no
particular deference to the trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn
v. Department of Transo., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.)/ cert.
d£Hifi£ 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon v. Farr. 770
P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989)).

Although "a defendant's requested lesser included offense
must be given when there is some evidence which supports the
theory asserted by defendant/" State v. Sfcandiford. 769 P.2d
254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152/
157-59 (Utah 1983)), there must also be a "'rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting Cher] of the included offense.*" State v. Laroccp,
794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (quotingfiaJsfii,671 P.2d at
159). Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is sufficient
evidence to support Sherard's request for a negligent homicide
instruction, and (2) whether there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting Sherard of murder in the second degree and
manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed, but still
convicting her of negligent homicide.
Negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter are related
concepts, both requiring that defendant's conduct be "'a gross
deviation' from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary
person." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. The only difference is
that manslaughter requires that the defendant was actually
aware of the risk of death, while in negligent homicide, the
defendant was not, but should have been aware of such risk.
Id. (citing Boooess v. State. 655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
Our review of the evidence indicates that Sherard's
request for a negligent homicide instruction is unsupportable.
Sherard's own testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her
something "heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like metal
or something," which she believed was a knife, and that she
punched Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after the
fight, she told Tommy Quintana, "I stabbed her, I think I
stabbed her." This testimony is inconsistent with negligent
manslaughter's requirement that the defendant be unaware of the
risks associated with her conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no
evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was unaware
of the risks involved. Without such evidence, we cannot
justify an instruction on negligent homicide.
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Sherard of the
greater offense, second degree murder. We, therefore, find
that there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting
Sherard of second degree murder and manslaughter and convicting
her of negligent homicide.

Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court, on similar
facts, held that "since the jury convicted of second degree
murder despite the f.act that an instruction was given on the
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a
negligent homicide instruction was, at very best, harmless
error.- Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the
jury on negligent homicide.
IV.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Sherard also contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in instructing the jury on self-defense and
mutual combat. Specifically, she argues that one of the
instructions concerning self-defense erroneously stated that
the test of the reasonableness of her actions was an objective,
not subjective, test; and that the mutual combat instruction
was irrelevant and confusing.
"[Bjeyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity
of the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v.
AlZ/ 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
However, the said instructions must not incorrectly or
misieadingly state material rules of law. I&.
Sherard argues that Jury Instruction Number 26 erroneously
stated that self-defense is governed by an objective, not
subjective, standard. Instruction Number 26 reads:
The reasonableness of a belief that
a person is justified in using force that
would.cause death or serious bodily injury
against another shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under
tiie then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 1991) provides that,
in order to successfully assert a claim of self-defense, a
defendant must "reasonably believe[] that such force is
necessary to defend [herself] . . . against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force." We have previously stated
that reasonable in the context of section 76-2-402(1) means
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-objectively reasonable.- State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah
1987)). This instruction plainly complies with the objective
standard requirement; therefore, the'trial court .did not err in
giving the said instruction.
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual combat
instruction that was given was irrelevant and confusing. The
instruction in question, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides:
If you find that either party was a
party to mutual combat, or other consensual
altercation, and that during the course of
the combat or altercation, either party
used a deadly weapon, then you must not
consider the consent of the victim in the
encounter as a defense to the crime of
Criminal Homicide.
Almost every account of the fight between Sherard and
Kelly indicates that it was, indeed, mutual combat. It was
therefore entirely appropriate for the trial court to clarify
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had mutually agreed
to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard's use of a deadly
weapon in that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed as
the initial aggressor. Sfifi State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90
(Utah 1981) and cases cited therein. Since the precise wording
of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, LQS&Z., 789 P.2d at 45, we hold that it was proper
for the trial court to give the mutual combat instruction in
question.
CONCLUSION
- In conclusion, we hold that: (l)-the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to sustain Sherard's conviction for
murder in the second degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective
jurors; (3) the trial court properly denied defendant's request
for a jury instruction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial

court did not err in instructing the jury on self-defense and
mutual combat. Accordingly, we affirm.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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APPENDIX 2
State's Brief Concerning Evidence
Supporting Lesser Included Offense Instruction

was not sufficient evidence, in fact, no evidence, that would
sustain that" (T. 626-627).

Later the court stated, "The Court

found there was no factual basis to sustain presenting [the
negligent homicide instruction] to the jury and, thus, it would
have been inappropriate to present that to the jury" (T. 631).
Defendant objected to this refusal (T. 630).
While negligent homicide is statutorily a lesser
included offense of murder in the second degree, this does not
mandate its inclusion in all homicide cases.

State v. Crick,

675 P.2d 527, 529-30 (Utah 1983); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d at
453; State v. Dyer# 671 P,2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983).

Under the

facts of defendant's case, a negligent homicide instruction could
only be justified if defendant, in stabbing the victim, was
"unaware but should have been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk, or that [she] failed to perceive the nature
and degree of the risk."

Boqqess v. State, 655 P.2d 654, 655

(Utah 1982) (citing the statutory definition of criminal
negligence, Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(4)).

Defendant does not

dispute this legal issue or the lower court's determination of
the appropriate law, but challenges the factual - application made
by the court.
Defendant's only factual support for the negligent
homicide instruction is defendant's statement to the police at
the time of her arrest.

In the statement given on March 7, 1987,

defendant stated that Todd Kingston gave her something in her

The statutory texts for the pertinent offenses are contained in
the introduction of this brief, at pages 2-3.
-31-

left hand as she was fighting the victim, Ruby Kelly (R. 288).
At the same time she heard him say "go with what you got- (R.
286, 287, 288). The object she received -fit right in [her]
hand, and [sic] it was heavy, and it was real cold and real hard
like metal or something- (R. 288). Being right handed, she
switched it to her right hand (R. 288). She did not state that
she knew it was a knife but was not -completely positive that
[she] didn't have anything- (R. 287).
After the state introduced defendant's statement at
trial, defendant took the stand and testified that her memory was
better at the time of trial than when she gave the statement (T.
549).

She stated that she had been confused and scared when she

talked to the police (T. 567). Defendant testified that in the
two intervening years she had come to terms with the killing and
the events were -a lot clearer- to her now (T. 549). In relation
to her use of the knife, she remembered at trial that it was not
Troy Kingston but Eloy Esquibel who gave her the knife (T. 523,
567).

She testified that while she did not look at the knife,

common sense

told her it was a knife -and she believed it was a

knife (T. 523-524).

She stated that she did not" think about not

swinging with the knife because she was scared and just thinking
of protecting herself (T. 525-26).

Her defense at trial was not

that she was unaware of the knife, but that either its use was
justified based as self-defense, or that she had recklessly had
it in her hand while fighting but without any intent to use it.
Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury on defendant's
theories of the case when it instructed the jury on the lesser

included offense of manslaughter and the justification of selfdefense.

See State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1988).
The only evidence which could possibly be construed as

constituting criminal negligence, i.e., that defendant did not
know she had a knife in her hand, was her original statement to
the police.

But, even defendant refuted the validity of that

statement by claiming that her trial testimony was more accurate
and detailed than her prior statement.

While a court should not

judge the credibility of the evidence offered in support of a
requested lesser included offense, the court must still determine
if a "sufficient quantum" of evidence has been offered.

Where

defendant admits that she was aware that she had a knife while
fighting the victim hand-to-hand, there exists no factual basis
to conclude that defendant's conduct merely constituted criminal
negligence.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (a defendant is

not entitled to an instruction on negligent homicide where no
rational view of the evidence supports it); Boqqess v. State, 655
P.2d at 655 (an instruction on negligent homicide is not
justified where a defendant, knowing the danger of a gun, points
what- he mistakenly believes is an unloaded gun at a person and
pulls the trigger).

See also State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,

267 (Utah 1988) (a defendant's knowledge of the risk of death
from the use of a weapon can be derived from the nature of the
wounds themselves).
Even if this Court were to find error in the lower
court's refusal to instruct on negligent homicide, the error
would be harmless. The jury was instructed on both the charged

